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[267] 
It’s a Blowhorn, Not a Dog-Whistle: 
 How President Trump’s Travel Ban Orders,  
Not His Statements, Are Enough to Establish 
 a Violation under the Religion Clauses 
by CHARLES ADSIDE, III* 
Introduction 
Most bigots speak softly.  They use dog-whistles, code words employed 
to prime bigoted sentiments within the listener.1  Not President Donald J. 
Trump; his voice on Islam is like a blow horn.2  His orders imposing travel 
bans on seven Muslim-majority countries were just as loud.  Although the 
Trump v. Hawaii Court claimed that the executive order it reviewed was 
religiously neutral, adherence to precedent reveals that all three executive 
orders violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.3  There is 
much discussion, however, regarding the President’s remarks about Islam.  
Many jurists conclude that they should be used for interpretative purposes in 
 
 *Lecturer, University of Michigan, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan–
Ann Arbor; General Counsel, Michigan Great Lakes Second Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, Church of 
God in Christ, Inc.; J.D., Michigan State University College of Law; B.A., University of Michigan–
Ann Arbor. I am grateful to my parents, Rev. Charles and Jacqueline J. Adside.  I thank other family 
members, such as my grandmother, Lovie D. Johnson, and my uncles and aunts, Paul and Kim 
Minor and Romie and Laurie Minor.  This Article would not have been written without 
contributions from dedicated research assistants.  Sometimes they sacrificed Friday nights and 
weekends to ensure this project’s success.  I am fortunate to have had them work with me.  I thank 
Jonathan George and Nicholas Tomaino who served as a senior research assistants.  Jacob 
Chludzinski worked as the team project manager.  Seamus Lynch edited this manuscript.  Carlton 
Shane, Gabriel Slater, and Alexander Votta provided extensive research and writing support for 
this Article.  Mohamad Zawahra inspired this writing.   
 1. See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1505-14 (2005) 
(discussing research which reported that certain words subliminally primed stereotypical, and 
sometimes racist, views about whites and blacks among test participants). Ian Haney Lopez, The 
racism at the heart of the Reagan presidency, https://www.salon.com/2014/01/11/the_racism_ 
at_the_heart_of_the_reagan_presidency/. 
 2  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435-38 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(presenting at least 20 anti-Muslim statements from President Trump).  
 3. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418. 
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First Amendment controversies.4  The reason given for doing so is that they 
reveal that the travel bans are no different than the exclusion orders in 
Korematsu v. United States. 
The Korematsu Court held that the forced relocation of Japanese-
Americans during the Second World War did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, because the exclusion constituted a public necessity.  
Military imperatives left no time for the government to distinguish loyal 
Japanese from disloyal ones.5  That decision is universally assailed today.6  
In fact, Trump v. Hawaii explicitly reversed the decision.7  But Justice 
Sotomayor’s Dissent argued that dismissing President Trump’s statements 
while upholding his travel ban made Trump v. Hawaii logically similar to 
Korematsu.8  The statements reveal, some argue, religious animus while 
race-based exclusion orders reveal racial animus.9  Personally, I agree, but 
the statements are not necessary to establish a constitutional violation, even 
as they are contrary to our constitutional values. 
The Founders rejected a pure democratic system in part because they 
feared the rise of demagogues, who inflame group resentments for political 
purposes.10  These politicians do not address nuanced dimensions of public 
 
 4. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that a reasonable observer 
would consider President Trump’s statements and conclude that the Proclamation was motivated 
by Muslim animus); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(“Perhaps in implicit recognition of the rawness of the religious animus in the President’s pre-
election statements, the Government urges us to disregard them.  This is a difficult argument to 
make given that the President and his advisors have repeatedly relied on these pre-election 
statements to explain the President’s post-election actions related to the travel ban.”) (footnote 
omitted); Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the government’s appeal 
of an emergency stay of the lower court’s injunction in part because “the States have offered 
evidence of numerous statements by the President about his intent to implement a ‘Muslim ban’ as 
well as evidence they claim suggests that the Executive Order was intended to be that ban, including 
sections 5(b) and 5(e) of the Order.  It is well established that evidence of purpose beyond the face 
of the challenged law may be considered in evaluating Establishment and Equal Protection Clause 
claims.”); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, at 34-35 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3518057/Order.pdf (The Government appropriately 
cautions that, in determining purpose, courts should not look into the “veiled psyche” and “secret 
motives” of government decisionmakers and may not undertake a “judicial psychoanalysis of a 
drafter’s heart of hearts.”  The Government need not fear.  The remarkable facts at issue here require 
no such impermissible inquiry.  “For instance, there is nothing ‘veiled’ about this press release: 
‘Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States.[]’”). 
 5. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). 
 6. Trump, 138 U.S. at 2423 (calling Korematsu “morally repugnant”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 2447. 
 9. Id. at 2435-38. 
 10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histd 
ox/fed_10.html (“A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and 
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders 
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose 
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policy; rather, they employ calculated “culturally emasculating images” to 
stigmatize opponents.11  They don’t care about individual rights, and they 
avoid meaningful dialogue.12  Instead, they seek raw political power.13  
Alexander Hamilton observed that “demagogues” begin their public careers 
appealing to populist sentiment to project the image that they are the people’s 
champion, but end their tenures as “tyrants.”14  In Federalist Paper No. 10, 
James Madison warned that such leaders are dangerous to the body politic 
because they arouse “factions” “who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other 
citizens.”15  The United States Constitution was designed to hinder the rise 
of such characters, and adhered to republican principles to do so.16  However, 
the Founders recognized that the normal operations of democracy in the 
constitutional system were at risk from the “tyranny of the mob.”17 
Southern politicians turned the Framers’ nightmares into reality.  “In 
the twentieth century, racist demagogues refined methods to control public 
discourse, encouraging hysteria about desegregation as an alien threat to 
Southern life.”18  Their rhetoric aimed to incite communities to violence via 
racist demagoguery.19  For instance, one governor earned a notorious 
reputation for angering crowds about “beastly black men” raping virgin 
white women: “We would be justified in slaughtering every Ethiop on earth 
to preserve unsullied the honor of one Caucasian home.”20  Not one to be 
outdone, Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi demanded that white 
males thwart black suffrage: “I call on every red-blooded white man to use 
 
fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, 
inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress 
each other than to co-operate for their common good.  So strong is this propensity of mankind to 
fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous 
and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their 
most violent conflicts.”). 
 11. Michele Goodwin, The Economy of Citizenship, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 129, 186-94 (2003). 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ 
histdox/fed_01.html (“[T]hose men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest 
number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing 
demagogues, and ending tyrants.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Jamin B. Raskin, From “Colorblind” White Supremacy to American Multiculturalism, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 749 (1996) (arguing that James Madison’s concern about the 
“tyranny of the mob” can apply to racial minorities that were terrorized by white majorities).  
 18. Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside, III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence, and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1042 (2014). 
 19. See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 261-71 (1949) 
(describing “Rural Demagogues”).   
 20. JAMES C. COBB, THE MOST SOUTHERN PLACE ON EARTH 147 (1992). 
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any means to keep the n[———] away from the polls[;] if you don’t 
understand what that means you are just plain dumb.”21  What he meant, of 
course, was lynching: the torture, mutilation, and murder of black men by 
white mobs.  Politicians like Senator Bilbo knew what they were doing, and 
did it well.  They stirred up terror against blacks in a region where lynching 
was ominous, routine, and heinous.22  Such appeals to violence by elected 
officials against an entire group seems unthinkable today. 
Near the dawn of the 21st century, many hoped that such open bigotry 
was dead.  Some commentators argued that we now live in an inclusive, even 
post-bigoted society, where characteristics like race no longer matter.23  And 
yet, like a phoenix, public bigotry rises from the ashes: “[A] cottage industry 
of radio hosts, television personalities, and even politicians now specialize 
in manufacturing ethnic conflict by injecting divisive speech into political 
discourse; this dynamic is not limited to any political ideology or party.”24  
 
 21. Robert L. Fleeger, Theodore G. Bilbo and the Decline of Public Racism, 1938-1947, THE 
JOURNAL OF MISSISSIPPI HISTORY, http://www.mdah.ms.gov/new/wp-content/uploads/2013/07 
/bilbo.pdf. 
 22. Cobb, supra note 22, at 114-115, 163 (discussing lynch mobs attacking blacks in the Deep 
South). 
 23. The use of the term “post-bigoted society” as an umbrella term to not only include race, but 
other protected categories like religion in our discussion.  The phrase “post-racial” has been more 
developed, however.  See Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, 5 THE MOD. AM. 26, 39 
(2009) (“[A] prospective commitment to colorblind race neutrality is now sufficient to promote 
racial equality, and any deviation from such neutrality will itself constitute unlawful discrimination.  
Although versions of this view have been around since the era of official segregation, the claim 
that we now live in a postracial society has acquired enhanced plausibility from the success of 
prominent racial minorities in roles that were traditionally reserved for whites.  Those successes 
have ranged from the golfing achievements of mixed-race Tiger Woods in a traditionally white 
game, to the selection of black politician Michael Steele as head of the Republican Party, to the 
election of mixed-race Barack Obama as President of the United States.”) (footnotes omitted); 
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 
967, 968 (2010) (“Post-racialism is a set of beliefs that coalesce to posit that racial discrimination 
is rare and aberrant behavior as evidenced by America’s and Americans’ pronounced racial 
progress.  One practical consequence of a commitment to post-racialism is the belief that 
governments—both state and federal—should not consider race in their decision making.”).  But 
see Reginald T. Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 503, 503–05 (2009) (observing that claims that the United States is a post racial 
society with the election of Barack Obama to the presidency are “decidedly premature.”); Nikole 
Hannah-Jones, The End of the Postracial Myth, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 15, 2016) (arguing that 
Donald Trump’s election to the presidency disproves that the post-racial theory as many Trump 
supporters were primed by racial anxiety).   
 24. Charles Adside, III, Replay That Tune: Defending Bakke on Stare Decisis, 64 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 519, 559 (2016) (some scholars conclude that a variety of topics that confront the public 
are still vulnerable to demagoguery, which prevents collective action or impoverishes discussion 
on critical issues).  Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual “Invasion”: Past as Prologue in 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 392 (2018) (referring to 
President Trump’s anti-Muslim statements as “nativists demagoguery”); Robert A. Ferguson, The 
Immigrant Plight/Immigration Law: A Study of Intractability, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 241, 248–
49 (2012) (accusing politicians, like Senator John McCain and Governor Jan Brewer, of engaging 
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Presidential electoral politics is not immune.  Like Noah, President Trump is 
“perfect in his generation” among the demagogues.  For three decades, he 
has injected hateful rhetoric into the national discourse with abandon.25 
 
in “excessive rhetoric” and “demagoguery” with claims that illegal immigrants intentionally cause 
car wrecks or commit beheadings in Arizona); David Aronofsky, The War on Terror: Where We 
Have Been, Are, And Should Be Going, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 90, 102 (2012) (identifying 
“political demagoguery” as creating a climate in which Congress cannot pass legislation to 
adequately address the status of combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay); Muriel Morisey, Fifty 
Years After the Sit-Ins: Events, Trends, and Recommendations, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 82, 92 
(2010) (claiming that the opponents of the Affordable Care Act “engaged in demagoguery” by 
fostering the belief that the law would “kill grandma”).  
 25. Well before his presidency, Donald J. Trump interjected rank bigotry into public discourse, 
making claims with no basis in fact.  In 1989, he purchased full-page advertisements in four New 
York City newspapers, calling for the death penalty in response to the arrest of five black and Latino 
teenagers, known as the Central Park Five.  The teens were wrongfully accused and sentenced for 
the rape of a white woman.  Even though the teens were recently exonerated via DNA evidence, 
President Trump refused to apologize for his advertisements. Jan Ransom, Trump Will Not 
Apologize for Calling for Death Penalty Over Central Park Five, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/nyregion/central-park-five-trump.html.  Years later, Trump 
continued to arouse racial suspicions, becoming the national spokesperson for “birtherism.”  In this 
role, he accused the first black president of being born in Kenya and thus ineligible to occupy the 
office.  Aaron Sharockman, Full Flop: Donald Trump abandons Barack Obama birther conspiracy, 
POLITIFACT (Sept. 16, 2016, 11:33AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/ 
2016/sep/16/donald-trump/full-flop-donald-trump-abandons-barack-obama-birth/; U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of 
President.”).  This debunked claim had profound racial implications, since the Court held, in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), that blacks could not be American citizens.  He based his 
presidential campaign on xenophobic fears too, announcing that “When Mexico sends its people, 
they’re not sending their best . . . .  They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
bringing those problems with us.  They’re bringing drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  They’re rapists.  
And some, I assume, are good people.”  Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement 
Speech, TIME (June 16, 2015), https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.  
As president, he justified hate crimes, drawing a moral equivalence between white supremacists 
and so-called left-wing activists during a clash.  A neo-Nazi ran into a crowd with his truck, injuring 
nineteen people and killing one during a demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia.  There, neo-
Nazis marched with tiki torches and clubs to protest the removal of a statue honoring Confederate 
General Robert E. Lee, chatting “You will not replace us!”  and “Jews will not replace us!”  Joe 
Heim, Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence and Death, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-timeline/.  After the tragedy, 
the President argued that “I think there is blame on both sides,” he remarked in a press conference, 
“You had a group on one side that was bad. You had a group on the other side that was also very 
violent. . . .”  Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on 
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html.  Shockingly, he 
believes that African and Afro-Caribbean nations are inferior, debasing them as “shithole 
countries” in a meeting with senators.  Ali Vitali, Kasie Hunt & Frank Thorp V, Trump referred to 
Haiti and African nations as ‘shithole’ countries, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 11, 2018, 2:19 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-na 
tions-n836946.  President Trump dismisses his political opponents on racial and religious grounds, 
denouncing his non-white critics as un-American.  Referring to four Congresswomen of color, he 
tweeted “[w]hy don’t they go back and help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from 
which they came.”  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 14, 2019, 5:27 AM), 
2 - ADSIDE MACROED 11-16-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:23 PM 
272 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:2 
On his campaign website, then-candidate Donald J. Trump proposed a 
religious test for entry into the United States; “Calling for a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”26  He justified 
his position to CNN’s Anderson Cooper, saying that “Islam hates us . . . .  
[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this hatred of the 
United States . . . .”27  Then-candidate Trump gave historical precedent for 
his “Muslim ban,” recounting that President Franklin D. Roosevelt “did the 
same thing” when he excluded the Japanese during World War II.28  The 
Trump administration ordered these sentiments into public policy.29 
If this demagoguery didn’t help him in the election, it didn’t hurt him: 
he won.  He lost no time in seeking to keep this campaign promise. 
President Trump issued three travel bans in less than nine months.  In 
January 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order No. 13769 (“EO-1”) 
 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1150381395078000643 (emphasis added).  All four 
Congresswomen are, in fact, American citizens, and three are natural born citizens.  Domenico 
Montanaro, Trump’s ‘Go Back’ Rhetoric Is Sign Of A Racially Divisive And Turbulent Year 
To Come, NPR (July 19, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/19/743310472/ 
trumps-go-back-rhetoric-is-sign-of-a-racially-divisive-and-turbulent-year-to-com.  His 
interactions with crowds are borderline incitement.  On one occasion, the President joked 
about vigilante justice against illegal immigrants at the border.  Asking a crowd in Panama 
City Beach, Florida, what should be done when unarmed border patrol agents confront 
thousands of migrants, a crowd member shouted “‘Shoot ‘em!’ as laughter and cheers rang 
out across the room . . . .  Trump seemed to laugh and pointed to the crowd member who said 
it, before joking: ‘That’s only in the Panhandle you can get away with that statement,’ as the 
crowd continued to clap and cheer.  ‘Only in the Panhandle!’”  Chantal Da Silva, Donald 
Trump Jokes about Shooting Migrants at the Border: ‘That’s Only in The Panhandle You Can 
Get Away With That Statement,’ NEWSWEEK (May 9, 2019, 3:33 AM), https://www.news 
week.com/donald-trump-jokes-about-shooting-migrants-border-thats-only-panhandle-you-142 
0611.  
 26.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 27.  Id.; Theodore Schleiter, I think Islam Hates Us CNN POLITICS, (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index.html (“I think Islam 
hates us,” Trump told CNN’s Anderson Cooper, deploring the “tremendous hatred” that he said 
partly defined the religion. He maintained the war was against radical Islam, but said, “it’s very 
hard to define.  It’s very hard to separate.  Because you don’t know who’s who.”). 
 28.  Id. at 2435.  
 29.  To be sure, these statements were not gaffes.  Nor were they “got-cha” moments.  Rather, 
they were calculated messages designed to prime anti-Muslim attitudes among certain voters.  See 
supra note 2.  He promised to put Muslim immigrants through “extreme vetting” before entry and 
then place them on a national registry.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2436 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  These measures were necessary, because “Islam hates us,” the President exclaimed.  
Id. at 2417.  These statements primed a public which negatively views Muslims. See generally 
Polling Report. Com: Religion, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 
2019]).  Citing to a comprehensive study, Professors Sides and Gross found that “[o]n average, 
respondents saw both Muslims and Muslim-Americans as more violent than peaceful and as more 
untrustworthy than trustworthy.”  John Sides & Kimberly Gross, Stereotypes of Muslims and 
Support for the War on Terror, 75 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 583, 587 (2013).  In fact, “[f]orty-
five percent of respondents placed Muslim-Americans on the ‘violent’ side of the spectrum, and 
51% placed Muslims on this side of the scale.”  Id.  
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entitled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States.”30  It banned foreign nationals from seven majority-Muslim nations 
from entering the United States for 90 days.31  It also suspended the Refugee 
Admissions Program (“RAP”) for 120 days.32  However, the order, in 
Section 5(e), carved out an exception.  It permitted the admission of refugees 
when doing so was in the national interest, and said this condition was met 
when the person is a “religious minority” in their county.33  This is a religious 
gerrymander, where the law is drawn up in a way that favors one religion 
over the other, in the same way that traditional gerrymandering draws 
political boundaries to favor one political party over another.34  This would 
have allowed the Trump Administration to admit more Christians from the 
Middle East, a major goal of the evangelical Christian wing of the 
Republican Party.35  This religious gerrymander is institutionalized in 
Section 5(b), which instructs that upon the resumption of RAP, the 
administration had to “prioritize” a refugee claim if it met two requirements: 
(1) the claim is based on religious persecution, and (2) the claimant is a 
religious minority in their country.36  The District Court for the Western 
District of Washington blocked the order, however, on First and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds.37 
Over a month later, the President revoked EO 1 and replaced it with 
Executive Order No. 13780 (“EO-2”).38  EO-2 explained that the refugee 
prioritization program for religious minorities “was not motivated by animus 
toward any religion.”39  And yet, EO-2 removed E.O. 1’s language that 
prioritized refugee claims found in Sections 5(b) and 5(e).40  This raises a 
question.  If EO-1 did not discriminate on the basis of religion, then why 
revoke its prioritization program for refugee claims based on religious 
minority status?  This change seems more prompted by the prospect of legal 
challenges than specific policy concerns.  The Trump administration tried to 
 
 30.  Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27. 2017) [hereinafter EO-1]. 
 31.  EO-1, supra note 32 at 8978. 
 32.  EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979. Only the entry of Syrian refugees was suspended 
indefinitely.  The order mentioned countries that didn’t meet safety standards.  Then, DHS named 
these countries.   
 33.  EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979-80. 
 34.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 35.  Marco Rubio and Russell Moore: This Christmas, we must remember slaughtered 
Christians in the Middle East. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/ 
12/24/marco-rubio-and-russell-moore-this-christmas-we-must-remember-slaughtered-christians-i 
n-the-middle-east/. 
 36.  EO-1, supra note 32 at 8979. 
 37.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403 (2018) (The Court entered a temporary restraining order 
blocking the restrictions.). 
 38.  Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). [hereinafter EO-2]. 
 39.  EO-2, supra note 38 at 13,210. 
 40.  See generally EO-2 and EO-1. 
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achieve two mutually exclusive objectives.  Stunningly, the order also 
removed Iraq from the target list.41  EO-2 claimed that Iraq presented “a 
special case,” arguing that, since EO-1, the “Iraqi government has expressly 
undertaken steps to enhance travel documentation, information sharing, and 
the return of Iraqi nationals subject to final orders of removal.”42  
Apparently, Iraq performed this Herculean task in one month and a 
week—miraculous, but not surprising, for a country as well-run and honest 
as Iraq.  That order expired.43 
In September 2017, the President issued a third order, entitled 
“Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted 
Entry Into the United States or Other Public-Safety Threats” (“EO-3”).44  
This order imposed restrictions on entry of immigrants from seven 
countries—Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—
because these nations did not meet the administration’s “baseline” for 
sharing information about the identities of those seeking entry into the 
United States.45  On procedural grounds, the Court concluded that this order, 
and only this order, was before it.46 
Trump v. Hawaii held that E.O. 3 was legal; the President could suspend 
the entry of undocumented people47 from the covered nations.  The Court 
found that Section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act “exudes 
deference” to presidential findings that entry of a class of undocumented 
people would be detrimental to the United States.48  Thus, the procedures 
developed to determine whether a country met the “baseline” for information 
sharing were more than enough to make President Trump’s “findings” 
permissible.49  However, while Section 1182(f) is deferential to presidential 
findings, no statute can empower the President to abrogate provisions of our 
Constitution.50  The Religion Clauses supersede any presidential order that 
construes a congressional enactment to impose a Muslim ban on entry into 
the United States.  On this issue, the Justices disagreed as to whether 
President Trump’s statements should be used to interpret the order.51  There 
 
 41.  EO-2, supra note 38 at 13212. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2404.  The order expired September 24, 2017, when the 
President issued his new proclamation. 
 44.  Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter EO-3]. 
 45.  EO-3, supra note 43 at 45164. 
 46.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404. 
 47.  The legalese “alien” is replaced with undocumented people or persons hereinafter.  
 48.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408.   
 49.  Id. at 2400-01. 
 50.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 51.  Compare Trump v. Haw., 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (“Plaintiffs argue that this President’s words 
strike at fundamental standards of respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition.  
But the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements.  It is instead the significance of 
those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within 
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are competing views.  One may argue that presidential or campaign 
statements are more reliable than legislative history.52  The argument for the 
reliability of legislative history posits that an interpreter consults a 
voluminous amount of information to discover the intent of a multi-member 
body, such as floor statements or committee reports.53  Executive intent, on 
the other hand, only requires an interpreter to investigate a single mind.  By 
this argument, if legislative history is a permissible source for statutory 
interpretation, then presidential statements are even better.  But like “extreme 
vetting,” these statements are subject to “extreme manipulation” because the 
President can issue new proclamations, signing statements, or have aides 
appear on CNN, FOX, MSNBC or any other news broadcasts to convey 
propaganda designed to obscure or reinterpret the purpose of his actions.54  
We cannot tell if they were telling the truth at one point but not another. 
This Article concludes that this debate on these bigoted statements are 
unnecessary to resolve constitutional questions under the First Amendment.  
All three orders violated the Religion Clauses on their own terms, structure, 
and circumstances.  Importantly, Religion Clause jurisprudence should lead 
interpreters to examine EO 1.  President Trump issued EO-2 and EO-3 in 
response to litigation designed to conceal anti-Muslim bias in federal 
courthouses.  Viewed in context, EO-2 and EO-3 actually reveal a religious 
test for entry.  However, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court put on blinders, and 
pointed to EO-3 as the only order before it.55  This shortsighted view is 
contrary to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which requires a 
contextualized approach to evaluating the actions at issue.  The Court has 
not been so easily fooled in the past. 
In McCreary v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the Court 
used the context of actions to uncover an impermissible motive; they 
invalidated a religious display, even though the plaintiff (a Kentucky county) 
changed their displays three times in response to litigation.56  The Court 
found that the third display did not remove the religious motive in the first 
 
the core of executive responsibility.”) with id. at 2435-38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although 
the majority briefly recounts a few of the statements and background events that form the basis of 
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge . . . that highly abridged account does not tell even half of the 
story . . . .  The full record paints a far more harrowing picture, from which a reasonable observer 
would readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by hostility and animus toward the 
Muslim faith.”). 
 52.  See infra Part I.C of this Article; Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative 
History. 
 53.  Id.  
 54.  See infra Part I.C of this Article; Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative 
History.  
 55.  138 S. Ct. at 2404. 
 56.  McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2003).  See infra Part II. A; Three 
Displays, Three Orders: How McCreary and Trump v. Hawaii Are Similar. 
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display, as the government’s actions were not “genuine, but a sham.”57  The 
changes were only meant to conceal the government’s religious intent.  This 
Article contends that there are stark parallels between that case and Trump 
v. Hawaii.  Like the displays in McCreary, the President issued two 
subsequent executive orders within a few months “only as a litigating 
position” to conceal a religious test to gain entry into the United States.58  
The orders also violated the Free Exercise Clause, as explained in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah.59  There, the Court identified a 
religious gerrymander when an ordinance solely banned animal sacrifices, 
which were performed as part of a religious ceremony.60  Similarly, the 
Refugee Prioritization Program in EO-1 created a gerrymander too, 
disfavoring Islamic refugee claimants while giving priority to refugee claims 
filed by non-Muslims. 
This Article discusses the following.  Part I explains the effect of the 
travel bans, the procedural history leading up to Trump v. Hawaii, and the 
Court’s reasoning in this case.  I conclude that courts should not use either 
campaign nor presidential statements to interpret law, because they are less 
reliable and legitimate than legislative history.  Furthermore, Part II 
concludes that the President’s statements are not needed to find the orders’ 
violations under the Religion Clauses.  The text and structure of the 
orders are enough.  Thus, Part III disagrees with Trump v. Hawaii, and 
contends that this case, like Korematsu, does not solely involve national 
security matters; rather, it is an individual rights case that fails a strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
I. How Executive Orders Became Blowhorns: Procedural 
History, Trump v. Hawaii, and the Unreliability of Campaign and 
Presidential Statements. 
A. Three Travel Bans in Nine Months 
As previously mentioned, EO 1 banned all citizens from seven Muslim 
majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—
from entering the country for 90 days.61  The administration also suspended 
RAP for 120 days to allow the relevant agencies time “to determine what 
additional procedures should be taken to ensure that that those approved for 
refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the 
 
 57.  Id. at 864. 
 58.  See McCreary County, at 871. 
 59.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) [hereinafter Santeria]. 
 60.  Id. at 536 (Although the ordinance banned religious sacrifices, it included an exception 
for killing animals for consumption.). 
 61.  EO-1, supra note 32, at § 5. 
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United States.”62  Notably, the order “prioritize[d] refugee claims made on 
the basis of religious persecution, provided that the religion of the individual 
is a minority religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”63  Within 
one week, the District Court for the Western District of Washington issued 
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) blocking the administration from 
enforcing the order nationwide.64  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit rejected the Government’s appeal to stay the injunction, 
concluding that “[t]he Government has not shown that it is likely to succeed 
on appeal,” and “not[ing] the serious nature of the allegations the States have 
raised with respect to their religious discrimination claims.”65 
Thirty-eight days later, President Trump revoked EO-1 and issued EO-
2.  Significantly, EO-2 removed Sections 5(b) and 5(e) of EO 1, which gave 
priority to claimants who were religious minorities in their nation of origin.66  
Even though EO 2 expunged those sections, it defended them, positing that 
the revoked sections did not intend to religiously discriminate: 
[EO-1] did not provide a basis for discriminating for or against 
members of any particular religion.  While that order allowed for 
prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious 
minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, 
including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to 
minority sects within a religion.  That order was not motivated by animus 
toward any religion, but was instead intended to protect the ability of 
religious minorities—whoever they are and wherever they reside—to avail 
themselves of [RAP].67 
EO-2 strived to further vindicate EO-1, explaining that six out of the 
seven countries targeted in EO-1 were selected because they were either state 
sponsors of terrorism, compromised by terrorist groups, or contained combat 
zones.68  However, the administration removed Iraq from the list because, as 
per the order, it presented a “special case.”69  Although Iraq’s conflict with 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) impacted its ability to secure its 
national borders and systematically identify fraudulent travel documents, 
EO-2 indicated that Iraq must be treated differently because it maintains a 
“close cooperative relationship” with the United States.70 
 
 62.  Id. § 5. 
 63.  EO-1, supra note 32, at § 5(b). 
 64.  Wash. v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
 65.  Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 66.  EO-2, supra note 38, at § 1(b)(iv). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. § 1(d). 
 69.  Id.§ 1(g). 
 70.  Id.  
2 - ADSIDE MACROED 11-16-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:23 PM 
278 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:2 
Nevertheless, Judge Derrick K. Watson of the District Court for the 
District of Hawaii issued a (“TRO”) based, in part, on President Trump’s 
statements; the administration argued that the court should not examine the 
“veiled psyche” and “secret motives” of government decisionmakers, and 
should not engage in ‘‘judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of 
hearts.”71  Judge Watson strongly disagreed.  He said that “there is nothing 
‘veiled’ about this press release: ‘Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.’”72  The Court 
granted a partial stay of the TRO issued by Judge Watson, requiring that 
those who have a “credible claim of bona fide relationship with a person or 
entity in the U.S.,” will be exempt from the 90 day suspension.73  If such a 
relationship is enough for the administration to be satisfied about the safety 
of allowing such individuals into the country, perhaps their concerns are not 
as serious as they claimed.  EO-2 expired, however, before the Court could 
take action.74 
President Trump issued EO-3 on September 24, 2017.75  This order 
developed an information sharing “baseline” for foreign governments’ 
capability and willingness to identify the identities and security risks of their 
citizens who are seeking entry into the United States.76  The baseline 
examined three areas: (1) the integrity of travel documents issued by the 
foreign country, (2) the extent to which the foreign government discloses the 
criminal history or links to terrorists groups of passengers traveling to the 
U.S., and (3) the national security risk posed by the foreign government.77  
Supposedly applying this calculus to every country on Earth, the President 
removed Sudan from the list of designated countries; added Chad, North 
Korea, and Venezuela; removed the expiration dates of the ban; and, added 
a cap to the number of refugees allowed to enter the United States.78  On 
October 17, 2017, Judge Watson granted another TRO.79  Instead of focusing 
on the Establishment Clause, he focused on discrimination based on a 
nationality: “EO-3 suffers from precisely the same maladies as its 
predecessor: it lacks sufficient findings that the entry of more than 150 
million nationals from six specified countries would be ‘detrimental to the 
interests of the United States.’”80  For Judge Watson, the administration’s 
 
 71.  Trump v. Haw., NO. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 34-35, https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/3518057/Order.pdf. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 76.  EO-3, supra note 44, at § 1(c). 
 77.  Id. § 1(c)(i)-(iii). 
 78.  See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2405-06. 
 79.  Haw. v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1145 (D. Haw. 2017).  
 80.  Id.  
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“baseline” did not justify the order.  However, the Ninth Circuit stayed Judge 
Watson’s TRO, with the exception of allowing the entry of foreign nationals 
with a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in this country.81  
Satisfied with the language of the proclamation, the Court allowed the 
proclamation to go into effect.82  The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to hear Trump v. Hawaii.83 
B.  Trump v. Hawaii 
Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis focused only on EO-3, the only order 
remaining active at the time.  He ignored E.O. 1, which the administration 
revoked, and E.O. 2, which expired.  This cramped view divorces the review 
of EO-3 from Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which requires reviewing 
courts to place the order within its legal context.  It had significant context, 
considering that it was the third issued in less than nine months, and all of 
them were responses to national injunctions.84  The Court’s myopic approach 
permitted the administration to conceal its religious motives, which allowed 
the Trump v. Hawaii Court to rest its ruling on the INA’s broad, discretionary 
language.  That Act renders an undocumented person inadmissible to the 
United States for multiple reasons.85  The decision here turned on 8 U.S.C. 
Section 1182(f). That statute delegates broad authority to the President to 
suspend entry of an entire group of undocumented people if he considers it 
necessary.  Section 1182(f) provides that: 
 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any [undocumented 
people] or of any class of [undocumented people] into the United 
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he 
may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem 
necessary, suspend the entry of all [undocumented people] or any 
class of [undocumented people] as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or 
impose on the entry of . . . any restrictions he may deem to be 
appropriate.86 
 
The Chief Justice found that every statutory clause supported the notion 
of presidential deference.  First, he reasoned that § 1182(f)’s only 
requirement for the president to prohibit entry is for him to “find[]” that 
admissibility of an undocumented person “would be detrimental to the 
 
 81.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923. 
 84.  See infra discussion on McCreary, Part II. A. 
 85.  Trump v. Hawaii. at 2407. Example reasons are participation in genocide, use of child 
soldiers, and terrorist activities.  
 86.  Id. at 2408. 
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interests of the United States.”87  In fact, the clause does not impose any set 
of guidelines for the President to follow when making this determination.  
Thus, the information sharing baseline used to make the finding at issue was 
more than sufficient.88  Second, he found that the term “suspend” denoted 
deference too, as the statute placed no limitation on the duration of such 
suspension.89  The suspension may last “for such period as [the President] 
shall deem necessary.”90  Lastly, this suspension may be applied to “any class 
of [undocumented people].”91  The term “class” is undefined, and thus broad 
enough to encompass a class of undocumented people “linked by 
nationality.”92 
This decision has two profound consequences, but the logic behind 
each, contradicts the other.  As stated, the majority Opinion affirmed broad 
congressional delegation of presidential authority in the area of immigration 
policy.93  However, the Court also overturned Korematsu, a case which 
supported such broad executive discretion.94  The Majority made a 
questionable distinction between the different executive actions in 
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii: the action in the former was taken “solely 
and explicitly on the basis of” anti-group sentiment, but the action in the 
latter was based on legitimate grounds.95  Justice Sotomayor strongly 
disagreed.  In her Dissenting Opinion, she pointed to President Trump’s 
campaign statements regarding Islam as evidence of religious animus.96 
While Chief Justice Roberts nodded to the existence of  the President’s 
anti-Muslim statements, he concluded that they carried no interpretative 
weight.97  He described EO-3 as a “directive, neutral on its face, addressing 
a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”98  He argued that such 
a ban was facially neutral, and that merely “denying certain foreign nationals 
the privilege of admission” could not be compared to Korematsu’s forcible 
relocation of American citizens based on race.99  Satisfied with the facially 
neutral order, Chief Justice Roberts concluded his investigation.  Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent furiously rejected the Court’s circumscribed approach.  
 
 87.  Id. at 2408-09. 
 88.  Trump v. Hawaii. at 2409. 
 89.  Id. at 2409-10. 
 90.  Id. at 2410. 
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 2407-10. 
 94.  Trump v. Hawaii. at 2447-48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 95.  Id. at 2423. 
 96.  Id. at 2435-39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2418. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. at 2423. 
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She criticized EO-3 as “motivated by anti-Muslim animus.”100  She said that 
the Court’s reasoning in Trump v. Hawaii had “stark parallels” to Korematsu; 
the travel ban, like the exclusion order, was based on an “ill-defined national 
security threat” to justify a sweeping policy.101  She pointed to at least 20 of 
President Trump’s campaign statements, as well as various press releases 
and interviews, as strong evidence that the order was based on animus 
towards Muslims.102  Although I agree that the orders are motivated by anti-
Muslim animus, I need not examine the President’s comments to find it.  It 
is tempting to view this President’s statements in a vacuum.  The issue is not 
whether this President’s prior statements should be admitted, but whether 
any presidential statements should be considered fair game when interpreting 
the law.  Such statements present a jurisprudential problem when employed 
as a tool for interpretation. 
C.  Presidential Statements Are Worse Than Legislative History 
Presidential statements are untenable as interpretive tools.  This 
becomes apparent when one compares informal statements by the 
Commander-in-Chief to the more traditional theory of statutory 
interpretation, legislative history.  Scholars and jurists have questioned the 
latter’s reliability, in part because actors frequently manipulate legislative 
history to reflect their interests.103  Lobbyists create legislative history to 
deceitfully make Congress “appear to embrace their particular view” of a 
law, and Congress engages in the “post-enactment creation of ‘legislative 
history’” by inserting their views into the Congressional Record after 
enacting a law.104  Should jurists overemphasize these questionable sources, 
they give effect to text and presumed consequences never written into law. 
This damages the legitimacy of the democratic process of lawmaking.  
However, Congress’ size somewhat mitigates the problem of manipulation.  
Congress consists of 535 members, meaning that groups with competing 
interests engage in the creation of legislative history.105  Consequently, it is 
difficult for any one group to manipulate legislative history into a single, 
coherent message.106 
 
 100.  Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 101.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2447. 
 102.  Id. at 2435-39. 
 103.  Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
371, 377 (1987). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (“The 
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind 
as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small.”). 
 106.  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is at 
best dangerous to assume that all the necessary participants in the law-enactment process are acting 
upon the same unexpressed assumptions.”).  
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In contrast, the unitary executive theory holds that the President can 
manipulate the history of the Executive Branch with ease.107  The President 
controls a vast communications apparatus.  He can communicate a unified 
message through “political storytelling, civic interpretation, persuasion, and 
mobilization” because there are no competing sources of power within the 
Executive Branch.108  Moreover, the White House employs numerous 
surrogates to spread the President’s message in the media.  The White House 
Office of Communications, for example, crafts executive statements to 
“strategically . . . advance the agenda of the President.”109  The Office of 
Digital Strategy uses social media to “amplify the President’s message.”110  
Finally, the White House Press Secretary is the “official spokesperson” for 
the President and provides official “comment[s] and response[s] to events 
and criticism” on his behalf.111  Finally, the President has his Twitter account.  
With nearly 65 million followers—about one fifth of the country—the 
Presidential Twitter account is a powerful communications tool.  A 
presidential tweet can become instant news, influencing the national 
conversation—just ask poor Mitt Romney.112  Should the President desire to 
manipulate his statements, or the interpretation of past ones, the White House 
has substantial resources to do so.  The Trump administration has made 
substantial use of these resources to recast the travel bans as a homeland 
security issue unaffected by anti-Muslim bias.113  Some opinion polls suggest 
 
 107.  Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 71, 76 (2017). 
 108.  Shaw, supra note 107 
 109.  See White House Internship Program, Presidential Departments, WHITEHOUSE.gov (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/get-involved/internships/presidential-depart 
ments/ (The White House Internship Program website gives a short description of each department 
within the White House.). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Martha Joynt Kumar, The Office of the Press Secretary, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 296, 
296 (2001). 
 112.  https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180487139546546182. 
 113.  The Trump Communication Team has repeatedly insisted that EO-1 targeted countries 
based on national security concerns and not religion.  Before he took office, his team began to 
downplay his past comments.  In a December 2016 interview with CNN, White House Aide 
Kellyanne Conway said that people who referred to proposed policy as a Muslim ban were ignoring 
the fact that he “talked about countries where we know that they’ve got a higher propensity of 
training and exporting terrorists . . . .”  Gregory King, Conway: Trump Will Not Pursue 
Immigration Ban Based Solely On Religion, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016, 10:22 AM), https://www. 
cnn.com/2016/12/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-donald-trump-muslim-ban/ index.html.  The day 
after President Trump signed EO-1, his Cybersecurity Advisor Rudolph Giuliani told an 
interviewer that the ban was “not based on religion” but “places where there [is] substantial 
evidence that people are sending terrorists in the country.”  Amy B Wang, Trump Asked For A 
‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says - And Ordered A Commission To Do it ‘Legally’, WASH. POST (Jan. 
29, 2017, 3:32 PM), https://www. washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-
for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/.  Trump’s surrogates 
continued to insist that the policy was based on national security concerns and not religious bias 
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that the President’s efforts have been largely successful among voters.114  So 
the White House Communications apparatus can serve as a smokescreen 
covering the executive’s true intent. 
Despite these problems, proponents of using presidential and campaign 
statements argue that executive intent is easier to discover than legislative 
intent.  Since the President is a single person, investigating his or her 
intentions requires a smaller universe of information; the press statements, 
speeches, and signing statements, where the President announces his or her 
legal interpretations.115  In fact, the President often issues signing statements 
to announce the personal intent not to enforce some statutory provisions in 
ways that may infringe on his constitutional powers.116  Anyone trying to 
interpret legislative history, on the other hand, must consult the drafts, floor 
statements, and voluminous committee reports.117  Such an inquiry may be a 
fool’s errand; representatives have a myriad of motives for voting for a law 
with competing interpretations.118  In contrast, the unitary executive, has 
but one motive to discover and thus only that person can shed light on 
 
throughout the legal proceedings against it, although the President Trump refused to disavow his 
prior statements regarding a Muslim ban.  Solicitor General Noel Francisco said that President 
Trump “has made crystal-clear that Muslims in this country are great Americans and there are 
many, many Muslim countries who love this country, and he has praised Islam as one of the great 
countries [sic] of the world.”  Christopher Cadelago, Josh Gerstein and Louis Nelson, Being Trump 
Means Never Having To Say You’re Sorry, POLITICO (Apr. 30, 2018, 7:07 PM), https://www. 
politico.com/story/2018/04/30/trump-muslim-ban-no-apologies-560287.  Similarly, White House 
Press Secretary Sarah Sanders stated in a 2018 press conference that the Executive Orders were 
focused on security, and stressed that it was “limited to a small number of countries” and allowed 
citizens from “a lot of Muslim-majority countries” to continue “to travel to and from the United 
States . . . .”  Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, WHITEHOUSE.GOV. (Apr. 25, 2018, 
2:19 PM), https://www.white house.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarah-
sande rs-042518/. 
 114.  55% Agree Trump’s Travel Ban Targets Terrorists, Not Muslims, RASMUSSEN REPORTS: 
POLITICS (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_po 
litics/april_2018/55_agree_trump_s_travel_ban_targets_terrorists_not_muslims; Steven Shepard, 
Poll: Majority of Voters Back Trump Travel Ban, POLITICO (July 5, 2017, 5:58 AM), https:// 
www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-travel-ban-poll-voters-240215; CNN ORC INT’L POLL 
7 (Feb. 2, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/03/re l2a.-.trump.pdf 
(reporting that the public was split on the travel bans with 53% opposed, and 47% in favor).   
 115.  See FEDERALIST PAPER No. 10, supra note 16. 
 116.  For example, when President Barack Obama signed the National Defense Authorization 
Act he indicated that he would not abide by Section 1032 and Section 1034, which related to 
Guantanamo detainee transferrers in situations where he determined they would violate the 
Constitution.  Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States, Statement by the 
President on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/23/statement-president-signing-n 
ational-defense-authorization-act-fiscal. 
 117.  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id.  
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statutory meaning.119  The interpretative process is made even easier with 
an executive order, some say, since it is purely an executive action.  
Congress is, thus, irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, presidential statements are less constitutionally 
legitimate than legislative history.  While the President and Congress both 
possess law-making authority, they have different roles in that process.  The 
Constitution vests Congress with “all” legislative power, which includes the 
power to write laws.120  Thus, it makes sense to consult the drafters of a law 
to determine its meaning.121  The President does not write law.  The 
Constitution limits the President’s powers to signing, vetoing, and enforcing 
laws.122  Neither legislative history nor presidential statements, however, 
pass through the process of bicameralism and presentment.  Consequently, 
they carry no legal force.123  Therefore, judges should use neither legislative 
history nor presidential statements for interpretative purposes.  If presidential 
statements do not carry legal weight, surely mere campaign statements do 
not.  Campaign statements, like legislative history, are “susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, depending on the outlook of the recipient.”  Their 
use would allow courts to adopt whichever interpretation “best supports its 
desired conclusion.”124  In fact, there is no principled way to distinguish 
between statements to use versus discard.  Take the following thought 
experiment as an example. 
Suppose a presidential candidate says, “I despise the South.  I wish 
Sherman had finished the job and burnt it all down!”  He is elected President.  
After his inauguration, he orders the small business administration to 
deprioritize loan requests from states which joined the Confederacy.  The 
order is challenged on Due Process grounds.  Plaintiffs argue that the order 
does not provide adequate process to Southern applicants, and point to his 
earlier campaign statement as evidence.  During litigation, the President 
addresses the nation from the Oval Office and states, “I love the South, and 
they’re great businesspeople!”  If presidential or campaign statements are 
 
 119.  Kathryn Marie Dessayer, The First Word: The President’s Place in “Legislative 
History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 411(1990) (When the President vetoes a bill, his reason for doing 
so is entered into the congressional record.  If he signs a later version with his recommended 
changes, his interpretation arguably should be an important factor interpreting it.).  
 120.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 121.  William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA REV. L. 621, 686 (1990) (arguing 
that if there is more than one plausible meaning, consulting legislative history can be useful for 
determining which one Congress intended). 
 122.  William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique, 66 IND. 
L.J. 699, 709-10. (1991).  
 123.  Starr, supra note 95, at 377; Thompson, 484 U.S. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 124.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 264 (2018) (Niemeyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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used to interpret executive orders, then which statement should a judge 
consider in this case?  They conflict with each other. 
At best, these statements are expressions of developing ideas and 
policies that are “explained, modified, retracted, and amplified” as campaign 
events progress and administrations mature.125  At worst, perhaps the Oval 
Office comments were in response to litigation and should be ignored.  Or, 
as a cynical approach, both statements have no meaning at all.  A presidential 
candidate can express a policy position during a campaign with no intention 
to implement that policy once elected into office.  A politician breaking 
campaign promises—perish the thought! 
While Chief Justice Roberts was correct to not consider extrinsic 
statements to interpret the order, his overall conclusion was fundamentally 
flawed for two reasons.  First, the order was not facially neutral.  
Establishment Clause jurisprudence requires that the reviewed text be 
contextualized, and the order was not reviewed in context.  Second, he 
forgets that the Constitution trumps all statutes.  Section 1182(f) does not 
empower the President to base his findings that entry of a call of 
undocumented people would harm the nation on the basis of unconstitutional 
grounds, such as an alien’s Islamic faith.  When viewed in context, EO-3 
violates the Religion Clauses.  McCreary and the Santeria case are 
instructive here. 
II. Religion Clause Principles: No Shams, No Gerrymanders 
A. Three Displays, Three Orders: How McCreary and Trump v. Hawaii 
Are Similar 
In McCreary, the Court saw through governmental attempts to hide 
religious motivations of an action.  It reviewed several displays which a 
Kentucky county placed in their courthouses.  At first, each county had gold-
framed copies of the King James Version of the Ten Commandments 
hanging visibly in the hallway.126  After the ACLU sued the counties, they 
erected a second display, expanding the Ten Commandments display to 
include eight other framed documents that had a religious theme.127  Some 
of the documents included the “endowed by their Creator” passage from the 
Declaration of Independence and the national motto, “In God We Trust.”128  
Unpersuaded, the District Court ordered the display be removed.129  In 
response, the courthouses hired new counsel and hung nine framed 
 
 125.  International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 264. 
 126.  International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 851-52. 
 127.  Id. at 853. 
 128.  Id. at 853-54. 
 129.  Id. at 854. 
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documents of equal size, one of them setting out the Ten Commandments, 
the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the 
lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the National 
Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady 
Justice.130  The collection entitled “The Foundations of American Law and 
Government Display” has each document with a statement about its 
historical and legal significance.131  McCreary held that their final display 
(along with the others) violated the Establishment Clause.  The original 
religious motive was still there, even after the counties changed their displays 
three times in one year.132  The counties only changed the display to improve 
their litigation position.133  This is like another, nobler Kentucky practice, 
that of putting a little water in one’s bourbon; It may go down smoother, but 
the liquor is still there!  Here, the “bourbon” was the religious content, and 
the diluting “water” were the neutral documents. 
McCreary found that Establishment Clause analysis examines if 
government has a “secular purpose.”  The Court found that this purpose 
cannot be secondary to a religious one; the secular purpose must be genuine 
and not a sham.134  To determine whether the government’s purpose is valid, 
an interpreter can examine evolving texts in light of the circumstances.  
Legislative statements are not needed for this analysis: “[P]urpose needs to 
be taken seriously under the Establishment Clause and needs to be 
understood in light of context; an implausible claim that governmental 
purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law any more than 
in a head with common sense.”135  The fact that the courthouses changed the 
display twice did not conceal religious motives in the solo Ten 
Commandments display, particularly when the changes were enacted in 
response to a year-long litigation. 
There are stark parallels between three religious displays in McCreary 
and the three travel ban orders in Trump v. Hawaii.  Like the courthouses in 
McCreary, President Trump changed the order’s text to conceal a religious 
motive in response to litigation.136  In January 2017, E.O. 1 imposed a 90-
day suspension of entry of aliens from covered seven countries, and 
prioritized religious-based refugee claims if an alien is a religious minority 
in the covered nation.137  But this order, like the display in McCreary, was 
struck by lower courts, who found that it violated the Establishment 
 
 130.  Id. at 855. 
 131.  Id. at 856. 
 132.  International Refugee, 883 F.3d at 855. 
 133.  545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005). 
 134.  Id. at 864. 
 135.  Id. at 874. 
 136. See 545 U.S. at 871. 
 137.  E.O. 1 § 1(c).  
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Clause.138  Two months later, E.O.2 removed language prioritizing 
religious minorities in the refugee program.  E.O. 2 lasted only six months 
but the District Courts for Maryland and Hawaii imposed nationwide 
injunctions against the order, which the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld.139 
Similar to McCreary, the travel ban’s national security purpose is a 
sham because substantial alterations to the text were ordered for litigation 
purposes.140  They were only inserted into the text to cover up the President’s 
intention to ban Muslims.  President Trump revoked E.O. 1 when the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the Executive’s appeal to seek an emergency stay to allow 
the order to go into effect.141  In fact, changes to the executive orders were 
as insincere, if not more so, than the display changes.  The three displays 
were posted within only one year, whereas the President issued three separate 
travel bans in a shocking nine months.142  If Trump v. Hawaii followed 
McCreary, it would have concluded that “in light of the context” the 
“implausible claim” that governmental purpose to impose a Muslim ban 
suddenly changed within 38 days after the President revoked E.O.1 “should 
not carry the day in a court of law any more than in a head with common 
sense.”143  Following McCreary, the purpose inquiry does not need to consult 
presidential or campaign statements.  An interpreter only needs to examine 
text changes in response to litigation to determine intent.  Here, alterations 
to the text, not statements, remain the touchstone. 
B. How The Orders Created a Religious Gerrymander 
When EO-1 can no longer hide behind the facially neutral EO-3, its Free 
Exercise violation becomes apparent.  In the Santeria case, the Court struck 
down animal cruelty ordinances for discriminating against the Santeria 
religion; respondents criminalized ritualistic animal sacrificing (not for food 
consumption), yet exempted animal killing, including kosher butchering: 
“The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are 
prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs 
during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an offering to 
the orishas, not food consumption.”144  Here, the Free Exercise analysis did 
 
 138.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 2018); 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 139.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F. 3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 142.  The President signed E.O.1 on January 27, 2017, and signed E.O. 3 on September 24, 
2017. 
 143.  Id. at 874. 
 144.  Santeria, 508 U.S. at 536. 
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not need to investigate the ordinance’s legislative history.145  Rather, the 
ordinance’s text and structure revealed the gerrymander, since Santeria 
sacrifice did not permit food consumption.  Thus, the city designed the 
ordinance to target that faith. 
Like the animal sacrifice ordinances, Section 5 of EO-1 created a 
Christian or non-Muslim gerrymander in violation of the Free Exercise 
Clause.  Undoubtedly, Trump targeted Muslim-majority countries in EO-1, 
where he declared in Section 3(c): 
 
I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into 
the United States of [undocumented people] from [Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen] would be detrimental to the 
interests of the United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the 
United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons 
for 90 days from the date of this order.146 
 
Section 5(a) suspended the refugee program worldwide for 120 days.147  
Like the kosher butchering exemption in the Santeria case, Section 5(e) is 
an explicit exemption carved out along religious lines: 
 
Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to 
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland 
Security may jointly determine to admit individuals to the United 
States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but 
only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals 
as refugees is in the national interest—including when the person is 
a religious minority in his country of nationality facing religious 
persecution . . . .148 
 
 
 145.  Id. at 534-36. 
 146.  EO-1, supra note 32. 
 147.  Id.  
 148.  Id. (emphasis added); Santeria, 508 U.S. at 535-36 (“[A]lmost the only conduct subject 
to[the] Ordinances . . . is the religious exercise of Santeria church members.  The texts show that 
they were drafted in tandem to achieve this result.  We begin with Ordinance 87-71.  It prohibits 
the sacrifice of animals, but defines sacrifice as “to unnecessarily kill . . . an animal in a public or 
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption.”  The definition 
excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifice, and the primary purpose 
requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting kosher 
slaughter . . . .  It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for our conclusion that Santeria 
alone was the exclusive legislative concern.”).  Id. at 536 (“The ordinance exempts, however, “any 
licensed [food] establishment” with regard to “any animals which are specifically raised for food 
purposes,” if the activity is permitted by zoning and other laws.  This exception, too, seems intended 
to cover kosher slaughter.”). 
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This section strikes at the sincerity of the President’s national security 
justifications.  What about religious minorities from any country makes them 
safer to admit then those in the majority?  Section 5(b) bolsters the Section 
5(e) exemption favoring non-Muslim refugee claims upon the resumption of 
the refugee program.  In other words, the religious gerrymander would be a 
permanent feature of the program, because the administration would 
“prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-
based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority 
religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”149  While the words 
“Islam” and “Muslim” are not explicitly mentioned, the order structurally 
disfavors Muslim refugee claims since these applicants are not individuals 
from a minority religion in the seven named countries.  The Trump 
administration’s supposed rebuttal to this point can be found in Section 
1(b)(iv) of EO-2, which explained that EO-1 did not discriminate against 
refugee claims on a religious basis: “While that order allowed for 
prioritization of refugee claims from members of persecuted religious 
minority groups, that priority applied to refugees from every nation, 
including those in which Islam is a minority religion, and it applied to 
minority sects within a religion.”150  The first claim of the Trump 
administration—that the priority applied to refugees from every nation, 
including those in which Islam is a minority religion—is irrelevant because 
EO-1 exclusively applied to Muslim-majority countries.151  The second 
claim—that the exemption reached minority sects within a religion—
requires more careful consideration.  Theoretically, Shia Muslims from Iraq 
and Syria and Sunni Muslims from Iran would receive priority status just as 
Christian applicants in the targeted countries.152  However, this argument is 
unpersuasive for two reasons. 
The contention that Sections 5(b) and 5(e) of EO-1 include minorities 
within Islam defies plain English.  The original executive order promised to 
“prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-
based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority 
religion in the individual’s country of nationality.”153  In effect, this would 
protect Christians, who are the minority religion in each of the predominantly 
Muslim countries listed on the travel ban.154  But Sunni and Shia Muslims 
are different sects within the same religion—each makes up the majority 
 
 149.  EO-1, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 150.  EO-2, supra note 38.  
 151.  EO-1, supra note 32. 
 152.  EO-2, supra note 38. 
 153.  EO-1, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 154.  See generally WORLD POPULATION REVIEW: SUNNI COUNTRIES (Sept. 27, 2019), http:// 
worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sunni-countries/. 
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religion in the banned countries.155  In a country like Iraq, where the Sunni 
minority faces persecution similar to the Christian minority, only the 
Christian minority has a valid claim for refugee status under the order’s 
minority religion exemption.  The persecuted Shia are lumped in as a 
member of the majority religion, albeit a minority member.  The orders do 
not recognize the basic distinctions between the terms “religion” and “sect;” 
however, the distinction between sect and religion makes no difference under 
the Establishment Clause.  It ought to be noted that the Trump 
Administration’s attempts to dissemble about what the first order did is 
exactly the sort of post-hoc manipulation of the record which makes the use 
Presidential statements untenable for interpretive purposes. 
In Larson v. Valente, the Court struck down a Minnesota statute 
exempting religious organizations from certain registration and reporting 
requirements if the organizations received more than 50% of their 
contributions from members because, “[t]he clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”156  So, according to the Trump administration’s own 
rationale, the refugee prioritization program violates the Establishment 
Clause; it favored Shia Muslim refugees over Sunni Muslim refugees.157  Six 
of the seven countries in EO-1 are Sunni-majority, while only one—Iran—
is predominantly Shia.158  Therefore, the unavoidable effect of the 
administration’s policy is that Sunni refugees was largely disfavored from 
entry into the United States to the benefit of Shia refugees.  This government 
preference toward a specific religious sect is the kind of religious 
discrimination that left “the newly independent States . . . powerless to tax 
their citizens for the support of a denomination to which they did not 
belong . . . .  [T]his reasoning led to the abolition of most [state 
denominations] by the 1780s, and led ultimately to the inclusion of 
the Establishment Clause . . . in 1791.159  Finally, if this prioritization did not 
discriminate on a religious basis, then it raises the question as to why EO-2 
removed language that prioritized claims of individuals from the minority 
religion in their country of origin.  EO-2 attempted to “have its cake and eat 
 
 155.  Id.  Sect, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.c 
om/dictionary/sect (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (The term “sect” is defined as “a religious group that 
is a smaller part of a larger group and whose members all share similar beliefs.”).   
 156.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).  “Denomination” and “sect” can be used 
interchangeably.  Denomination, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/ 
dictionary/english/denomination (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (defines denomination as “a religious 
group whose beliefs differ in some ways from other groups in the same religion”); thus, it is 
similarly defined as “sect.”  In other words, denomination and sect mean sub-groups with similar 
beliefs in the same religion. 
 157.  See EO-2, supra note 38. 
 158.  See generally WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, supra note 143. 
 159.  Larson, 486 U.S. at 244-45. 
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it too” by refuting an intent to discriminate while revoking the prioritization 
program.  But the damage had already been done. 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded, however, that these cases are 
irrelevant, because “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a 
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control.’”160  The next section 
explains that Trump v. Hawaii is not solely a national security case where 
the President receives deference; rather, it is an individual rights case that 
should have been placed in the crosshairs of strict scrutiny.161 
 
III.  Why President Trump’s Travel Bans Should Not Receive 
Deference 
A.  Presidents Receive Deference in Foreign Policy Matters 
In Article II, the Framers vested “the executive power” in one President 
of the United States.162  This design was implemented to remedy the defects 
of the Articles of Confederation, which provided for a unicameral 
Congress.163  The Founders concluded that the Articles were weak in its 
administration of the law.164  A government created by the Articles stands in 
stark contrast to a unitary executive.  Hamilton argued that a plural executive 
or multiple Presidents would create “mischiefs” and “dissension” like those 
 
 160.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 241. 
 161.  Some may argue that the Court could have invalidated the travel bans under other theories 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Sotomayor argued whether that the orders violated the 
animus principle announced in Romer v. Evans.  Trump v. Haw. 138 U.S. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  Perhaps, it could be argued that the orders denied Muslims “equal dignity” under the 
law.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment 
recognizes same-sex marriage).  Neither theory is necessary in this case, however.  The Free 
Exercise Clause is designed to ferret out religious-based discrimination sponsored by the 
government.  See Santeria.  But the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned with broad-group based 
discrimination, such as race, national origin, and alienage.  Gender is given intermediate scrutiny 
status and it appears that the Court extended protections on basis of sexual orientation.  Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment that denied protected 
status to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals violated the Equal Protection Clause); U.S. v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744 (2013) (invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.  With 
emerging theories like animus and even equal dignity in Romer and Obergefell, the Fourteenth 
Amendment still has room to include new groups.  Thus, it is not necessary to bleed these doctrines 
and create confusion.  Free Exercise has developed its own rules and it is adequate to handle these 
sorts of cases.  Santeria, 508 U.S. at 532 (explaining that the court uses strict scrutiny in Free 
Exercise cases).  As I will prove, strict scrutiny is sufficient to resolve Trump v. Hawaii. 
 162.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
 163.  Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 994-99 
(1993). 
 164.  Id.  
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which occurred between the Roman Consuls.165  Accordingly, the Framers 
rejected a proposal to select three executives.  They feared divisions on 
public policy, particularly in military affairs.166  A unitary executive, on the 
other hand, can act unilaterally in response to emergencies with considerable 
“energy” and “dispatch.”167  As a multimember body governed by rules and 
procedures, Congress is a slow-moving institution designed to produce more 
calculated and possibly better legislation.168  While deliberation may be a 
virtue in domestic policy, it is a detriment in foreign affairs.  As the attack 
on Pearl Harbor and the September 11 attacks demonstrate, foreign crises 
may occur at any time, and require a rapid response.  Thus, the President is 
the only actor who “can respond to a looming threat or emergency.”169  This 
is why Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70, identified an energetic executive as 
essential to repelling foreign invasions and thus is “the bulwark of national 
security.”170 
To this end, Article II grants the President broad authority as the 
Commander-in-Chief.171  Presidents have regularly used this authority to act 
unilaterally during wars and national emergencies, and have received 
deference from Congress in doing so.  For example, President Abraham 
Lincoln suspended habeas corpus, seized railroads and issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation without statutory authorization.172  He 
“consistently maintained” that his role as Commander-in-Chief authorized 
these bold actions.173  President Lincoln eventually sought and received 
legislative authorization for the presidential proclamation and executive 
order because of judicial criticism, yet Congress never insinuated that 
Lincoln had acted unconstitutionally.174  Likewise, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt routinely seized munition plants to avoid closures during World 
War II.175  In 1943, Congress enacted the War Labor Disputes Act to provide 
a statutory basis for President Roosevelt’s seizures.176  It recognized, 
however, that he “already had the necessary power” to seize.177  This robust 
view of presidential power continued in the post-World War II era. 
 
 165.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 166.  Prakash, supra note 152, at 999. 
 167.  Hamilton, supra note 154. 
 168.  Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of 
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 812, 826 (2013). 
 169.  Id. at 827. 
 170.  Hamilton, supra note 154. 
 171.  See Madison, supra note 16, at §1. 
 172.  Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 157, at 819-21. 
 173.  Id. at 819. 
 174.  Id. at 820. 
 175.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 695-97 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 176.  Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 697. 
 177.  Id. 
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More recently, President George W. Bush argued in favor of a robust 
executive with plenary war powers.178  He maintained that “no explicit 
congressional authorization” was needed to indefinitely detain suspected 
terrorists as “enemy combatants.”179  Congress displayed a similar 
understanding of presidential power in the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force of 2001 (“AUMF”).180  In its preamble, the AUMF declares that the 
Constitution empowers the President to act “to deter and prevent” terrorist 
attacks against the United States.181  Section 2 then grants broad presidential 
power to combat international terrorism, authorizing the President to use “all 
necessary and appropriate force” to respond to future terrorist attacks.182  The 
statute does not define “force.”  Nor does it specify the targets of that force.183  
Congress delegated authority to the President to decide when force is 
“necessary and appropriate,” and how to apply that force on any person, 
organization, or nations “he determines” can prevent future terrorist 
activity.184  As these examples show, unilateral Presidential action in national 
security affairs is consistent with this nation’s historical practices. 
The Court instructs deference to the President in immigration matters 
because they are tied to national security and foreign policy issues.185  In 
Arizona v. United States, they found that immigration enforcement requires 
“discretionary decisions” that “bear on [the United States’] international 
relations” because the President must “confer and communicate” with other 
nations regarding the presence, entry, and removal of their citizens.186  
Trump v. Hawaii’s Section 1182(f) shows that Congress defers to the 
President in this area, too.  It has delegated vast discretion to the President to 
determine when a noncitizen can enter the United States.187  Even if the 
courts should defer to the President in foreign affairs, deference was not 
warranted in Trump v. Hawaii.  That case does not solely involve national 
security matters. 
 
 178.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004). 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2001) 
[hereinafter “AUMF”]. 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id.  
 183.  See generally id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Ariz. v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 395-96 (2012).  “The Government of the United States has 
broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and . . .  Immigration policy can affect . . . 
diplomatic relations for the entire nation . . .” 
 186.  Id.  “Citizens” here means citizens of the foreign countries. 
 187.  See generally Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 157, at 851-52. 
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B. Trump v. Hawaii is not Solely a National Security Case 
Comparing Trump v. Hawaii to modern detention cases reveal that it is 
not the ordinary national security case—if it even should be described as 
such.  In the detention cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004), 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008), the petitioners challenged the President’s authority to detain 
them as “enemy combatants” during an armed conflict.  Therefore, these 
cases directly implicated the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief.  
However, Trump v. Hawaii, like Korematsu, is a hybrid case involving an 
executive order which targets a constitutionally protected class where 
national security is only superficially related to the case.  A comparison to 
Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene highlights these differences. 
In Hamdi, the petitioner was an American citizen that the U.S. military 
detained as an “enemy combatant” at Guantanamo Bay detention camp 
(“Guantanamo Bay”).  Hamdi argued that the government violated his due 
process rights because it prevented him from challenging his detention; the 
government responded that the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief, and 
empowered him to detain anyone fighting against the U.S. without due 
process until the cessation of hostilities to “prevent captured individuals 
from returning to the field of battle.”188  The Court employed the Mathews 
v. Eldridge balancing test to weigh Hamdi’s “private interest” in due process 
against the government’s “asserted interest” in preventing enemy forces 
from returning to the battlefield.189  Ultimately, the Court held that the 
government violated the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments because the risk of an erroneous detention was high since 
Hamdi could not challenge his status detention or designation as an “enemy 
combatant.”190 
In Hamdan, the petitioner was a Yemeni national detained at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp whom the federal government tried for 
“conspiracy ‘to commit . . . offenses triable by military commission.’”191  
Hamdan argued that the Bush administration’s military commissions tried 
detainees in a manner violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
 
 188.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528 (“Hamdi emphasizes that this Court consistently has recognized 
that an individual challenging his detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without 
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive’s asserted 
justifications for that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law.”); see also id. at 518. 
 189.  Id. at 529-32 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 355 (1976)). 
 190.  Id. at 535; see also id. at 532 (“We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to 
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”). 
 191.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). 
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Conventions.192  The government contended that Common Article 3 did not 
apply as the conflict with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was not a “conflict not 
of an international character.”193  The Court disagreed, finding that the 
Convention’s official commentaries instructed parties to give Common 
Article 3 an application that is ‘‘as wide as possible.”194  Thus, the process 
afforded to Hamdan failed to grant the judicial protections which Geneva 
requires be given to enemy combatants. 
In Boumediene, the petitioner, again a foreign national detained at 
Guantanamo Bay, asserted that the government deprived him of the 
constitutional right to habeas corpus by failing to provide him a “meaningful 
opportunity” to challenge his detention.195  President George W. Bush 
maintained that the Suspension Clause did not extend to the individuals 
detained at Guantanamo Bay because Cuba held de jure political jurisdiction 
there.196  However, the Boumediene Court held that the Suspension Clause 
“has full effect at Guantanamo Bay” because the United States exercised de 
facto control over the territory.197  Furthermore, it held that the process 
Congress provided to detainees was not “an adequate substitute for the writ 
of habeas corpus” because it did not provide detainees sufficient opportunity 
to challenge their imprisonment or enable a court to “order the conditional 
release of an individual unlawfully detained.”198 
These detention cases are different from Trump v. Hawaii. The issues 
presented there were directly related to the President’s role as Commander-
in-Chief. All three petitioners were enemy combatants who posed serious 
risks to national security.  If not detained, they would have continued to fight 
the United States on the battlefield.  This is evident from the circumstances 
of their capture.  For example, the government asserted that the Northern 
Alliance captured Hamdi after a “battle with the Taliban.”199  Hamdi was 
holding an assault rifle when he surrendered.200  The government inferred 
from this evidence that Hamdi was fighting as part of the Taliban, and thus 
 
 192.  Hamdan 548 U.S. at 571. 
 193.  Id. at 630.  Common Article 3 only applies in conflicts of an international character. hl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/466097d7a301f8c4c12
563cd00424e2b.  See commentary. 
 194.  Id. at 631. 
 195.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 799 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 
302 (2001)) (internal quotation marks ommitted). 
 196.  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753 (“[T]he [G]overnment says the Suspension Cause affords 
petitioners no rights because the United States does not claim sovereignty over the place of 
detention.”). 
 197.  Id. at 770-71 (“The detainees . . . are held in a territory that, while technically not part of 
the United States, is under the complete and total control of our Government.”). 
 198.  Id. at 771, 779. 
 199.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513. 
 200.  Id. 
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posed a national security threat.201  This inference justified his indefinite 
detention under the President’s plenary war powers.  In contrast, the order 
reviewed in Trump v. Hawaii does not involve enemy combatants detained 
on the battlefield.  It involves “ordinary” men, women, and children who 
have not attacked the United States.202  The order says that individuals pose 
a security threat not because of their own actions, but rather because of their 
religious affiliations.  Thus, Trump v. Hawaii’s national security issues 
appear to be secondary to discrimination claims—just like in Korematsu. 
Both Trump v. Hawaii and Korematsu involved allegations of bigotry 
against constitutionally protected classes, implicating the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments respectively.  In both cases, the national security 
claims are secondary to the group-based discrimination claims.  There is no 
evidence that an “[undocumented person] or class of [undocumented 
people]” from the covered nations in the travel bans are planning to attack 
the United States as occurred at Pearl Harbor or on September 11—or that 
being from those places made them more of a threat than someone from 
another country.203  Similarly, concerns of foreign espionage and invasion 
were superficial in Korematsu.  The race-based exclusion of Japanese 
Americans rested on the abstract assertions that the military lacked adequate 
time to separate the loyal from the disloyal.204  Since the Court held that strict 
scrutiny applied in Korematsu, it should have applied to Trump v. Hawaii as 
well.205  Doing so now reveals the racial animus involved in the exclusion 
order. 
C. The Travel Bans Do Not Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Courts apply strict scrutiny when a government action infringes on a 
fundamental right or discriminates based on a “suspect classification,” 
including race and religion.206  In these cases, courts should uphold the 
government’s action only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.207  Narrow tailoring requires that an action not be overinclusive or 
underinclusive.208  Government action is overinclusive if it “disadvantages 
 
 201.  Id. at 513-517. 
 202.  If they had, they would already be banned from the country per the INA’s section 1182(f). 
 203.  Alex Nowrasteh, New Government Terrorism Report Provides Little Useful Information, 
CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 16, 2018) (finding that American citizens were responsible for 78% of 
deaths in terrorism attacks on U.S. soil). 
 204.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219 (“It was because we could not reject the finding of the 
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal 
from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group.”). 
 205.  Id. at 216. 
 206.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2007). 
 207.  Id. at 1316. 
 208.  Adam Winker, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802-06 (2006). 
2 - ADSIDE MACROED 11-16-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:23 PM 
Winter 2020] IT’S A BLOWHORN NOT A DOG WHISTLE 297 
some people who do not . . . threaten the state’s interest.”209  The Korematsu 
Court readily admitted that “most” of the relocated Japanese “were loyal to 
[the United States].”210  So it was overinclusive; it treated loyal Americans 
as harshly as the disloyal.  Government action is underinclusive when it 
“fails to regulate activities that pose” the same threat to the purported interest 
as the regulated conduct.211  On this point, Korematsu fails by its own logic.  
The nation was also at war with Germany and Italy during World War II.  
Revealingly, the government did not relocate either Germans or Italians, and 
conducted “investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from the 
disloyal” among them.212  This is important because such fact-finding might 
have proven that Japanese Americans were loyal, yet they were denied that 
opportunity because of a supposed military imperative.213  From the 
government’s logic, that imperative existed with respect to Germans and 
Italians as well.  Those groups were not denied the opportunity to prove their 
loyalty.  Therefore, the relocation order was both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.214  Similarly, the travel bans present no evidence of a real 
national security threat or that those barred from entry are detrimental to the 
United States.  As the next section will show, the order is both overinclusive 
and underinclusive, revealing that the claimed national security interests are 
shams exposing anti-Muslim sentiments.215  When analyzed this way, 
campaign statements are not needed.  Rather, the text and structure of the 
order are enough to reveal the constitutional violations. 
I now apply strict scrutiny to the orders in Trump v. Hawaii.  The 
compelling state interest is stated in the titles of the respective orders.  For 
example, EO-1 is aimed to “[p]rotect[] the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States.”216  In the abstract, protecting the country from 
foreign terrorism is a compelling interest; however, narrow tailoring requires 
that the order precisely achieves its specific goal in a manner least restrictive 
to civil liberties.217  As previously discussed, a reviewing court should 
inquire into whether the orders were overinclusive or underinclusive.218  The 
bans are not narrowly tailored.  They are overinclusive as they offer no 
 
 209.  George P. Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal 
Protection, The Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J 1069 (1995). 
 210.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. 
 211.  Fallon, supra note 189, at 1328. 
 212.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 241 (Murphy, J. dissenting). 
 213.  Id. at 241. 
 214.  Id. at 241. 
 215.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2430 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 216.  See EO-1, supra note 32. 
 217.  Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  That prong requires that there 
is a precise “fit” or “exact connection” between the government objective and the means chosen to 
achieve those objectives.  Winkler, supra note 191, at 802-06. 
 218.  Winkler, supra note 191, 802-806. 
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guidance as to how consular officers should conduct case-by-case 
assessments to grant visa waivers, allowing the administration to deny visas 
to Muslim applicants, even those that satisfied the administration’s security 
terms.219  Justice Stephen Breyer, in his Dissenting Opinion, illustrates the 
orders’ overinclusive-ness, highlighting the fact that “[w]hile more than 
15,000 Syrian refugees arrived in the United States in 2016, only 13 have 
arrived since January 2018.”220  This suggests that the administration’s 
waiver system is excluding applicants for religious reasons; even as the 
administration “claim[s] that the Proclamation rests on security needs . . . it 
is excluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own terms.”221  An 
order justified by national security that excludes those who do not affect 
national security is by definition overinclusive.  Although the order does not 
facially contain these consequences, it is being applied in a way which does- 
and should therefore be reviewed in a way reflecting that. 
The travel ban orders are simultaneously underinclusive.  They omit 
countries that remain hotbeds for terrorist activity, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, while including two non-Muslim countries, Venezuela and 
North Korea, which do not in any way prevent foreign terrorists from 
entering the United States.222  Furthermore, North Korea does not willingly 
allow citizens to travel outside of its borders, and there were already 
sanctions in place restricting the entry of North Korean nationals to the 
United States.223  The inclusion of Venezuela and North Korea appears to be 
pretextual, “if not entirely symbolic.”224  A ban on the entry of Martians 
would be just as necessary.  Moreover, the ban on Venezuelans only applies 
to a “handful of Venezuelan government officials and their immediate family 
members,” presumably for political reasons.225  Therefore, “the President’s 
inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does little to mitigate the anti-
Muslim animus that permeates the Proclamation.”226  Furthermore, including 
Chad on the suspension list is puzzling, since “[t]he number of Chadian 
refugees allowed into the U.S. in the 2017 fiscal year was seven, according 
 
 219.  Trump, 138 U.S. at 2431-33. 
 220.  Id. at 2431. 
 221.  Trump, 138 U.S. at 2430 (“How could the Government successfully claim that the 
Proclamation rests on security needs if it is excluding Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own 
terms?  At the same time, denying visas to Muslims who meet the Proclamation’s own security 
terms would support the view that the Government excludes them for reasons based upon their 
religion.”). 
 222.  Id. at 2442 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 223.  Id.   
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Trump, 138 U.S. at 2431-33.  
 226.  Id.   
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to a State Department database.”227  Since there were so few Chadians 
entering the country as it is, prohibiting their further entry seems unlikely to 
affect national security at all.  More likely, the administration included them 
to add a country outside of the Middle East to the exclusion list, thus further 
obscuring the order’s anti-Muslim bias.  Think back to McCreary, and the 
dilution of their religious motive with secular documents.  If the ban on 
Muslims is the President’s liquor, he attempts to dilute it with the 
inclusion of North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad.  Simply put, the means 
do not fit the end. 
Conclusion 
Under Section 1182(f), Trump v. Hawaii grants unfettered discretion to 
Presidents to impose suspensions of entry of foreign nationals into the United 
States.228 Therefore, Congress must reassert itself in immigration policy.  For 
instance, Congress may require the President to notify it before he imposes 
other travel bans.  Congress can amend Section 1182(f) in its yearly National 
Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”).  It may also require congressional 
approval of such bans after a period of time.  This is not a novel idea.  
Congress did this previously, by requiring the President to notify it 30 days 
before he transferred a detainee from Guantanamo Bay to another country.229  
It went further and banned construction of any detention facility in the United 
States for Guantanamo Bay detainees.230  The President might be inclined to 
sign an act with such restrictions, because the NDAA allocates over 700 
billion dollars to the United States Department of Defense annually.231 
 
 227.  Krishadev Calamur, Why Was Chad Included in the New Travel Ban? The Country Is A 
Key U.S. Counterterrorism Ally, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2017).   
 228.  Trump., 138 U.S. at 2408 (“By its plain language, §1182(f) grants the President broad 
discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States . . .  By its terms, §1182(f) exudes 
deference to the President in every clause.”) (emphasis added). 
 229.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 10 U.S.C. § 3744 § 1035(d) 
(2014) (“The Secretary of Defense shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress of a 
determination of the Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days before the transfer 
or release of the individual under such subsection.”) (emphasis added).  
 230.  10 U.S.C. § 1033(a) (“No amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available to the Department of Defense may be used during the period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 2014, to construct or modify any facility in the 
United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual detained at Guantanamo . . . .”). 
 231.  See FY 2020 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, https:// 
www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY%202020%20NDAA%20Executive%20Sum 
mary.pdf. (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“The NDAA supports a total of $750 billion in fiscal year 
2020 funding for national defense, in line with the budget request . . . .”).  While President Obama 
expressed constitutional reservations about the notification requirement, he still signed the bill into 
law: “[T]he Congress has enacted unwarranted and burdensome restrictions that have impeded my 
ability to transfer detainees from Guantanamo . . . .  Section 1035 does not, however, eliminate all 
of the unwarranted limitations on foreign transfers and, in certain circumstances, would violate 
constitutional separation of powers principles.”  Press Release, Statement by the President on H.R. 
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If the President places himself in a standoff with Congress over these 
restrictions, like the historic 35-day government shut down, then Congress 
should consider radical measures.232  Trump v. Hawaii presents serious 
consequences.  The President now can impose any restriction as a 
requirement for entry in this country.233  Those restrictions are limitless, and 
could conceivably include bans, detentions, interviews, and even 
interrogations.234  Since this President stated that he would use torture during 
interrogations of suspected terrorists, he can evoke Section 1182(f) to 
accomplish illegal and unconstitutional goals.235  He has already done so.  
The travel bans arguably committed several constitutional violations: (1) 
Oath, (2) Nobility, (3) Bill of Attainder, (4) Corruption of Blood, (5) 
Establishment and (6) Free Exercise Clauses.236  There were possible Due 
Process and Equal Protection arguments available to plaintiffs too.237  There 
were, depending on the strength of these arguments, eight possible 
constitutional grounds to make claims against the President.  The solution is 
neither easy nor politically desirable. 
The normal means to check a President is two-fold: the ballot box and 
legislative oversight.238  The voters can punish either the President or his 
 
3304 (Dec. 26 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/26/state 
ment-president-hr-3304. 
 232.  Government Shutdown 2019, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/latest-news-updates/ 
government-shutdown-2019 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
 233.  There are no textual limitations on the restrictions the President can impose on immigrant 
entry into the Nation: “Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens . . . would be 
detrimental to the [national interests], he may . . . impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he 
may deem to be appropriate.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).  
 234.  Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408 (“[Section] 1182(f) vests the President with ‘ample power’ to 
impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated in the INA.”). 
 235.  ‘I’d Bring Back A Hell Of A Lot Worse Than Waterboarding’ – Trump At Debates, RT 
(Feb. 7, 2016, 10:07 AM), https://www.rt.com/usa/331629-trump-debates-waterboarding-republi 
can/ (“I’ll tell you what, in the Middle East, we have people chopping the heads off Christians.  We 
have people chopping the heads off many other people.  We have things that we have never seen 
before, as a group . . . .  I would bring back waterboarding and I’d bring back a hell of a lot worse 
than waterboarding.”). 
 236.  U.S. CONST. article II, § 1, cl. 8: (“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J. concurring) (arguing that government sponsored racial discrimination 
violates the Nobility, Attainder, and No Corruption of Blood Clauses); perhaps, similar arguments 
can be made against government sponsored religious discrimination using these Clauses.  See, e.g., 
McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding that government litigation positions do not erase its 
religious purpose); Santeria (identifying a religious gerrymander). 
 237.  Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down government action inspired by animus); 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendments protects an 
individual’s dignity under the law). 
 238.  See Robert Longley, Congressional Oversight and the U.S. Government, THOUGHTCO 
(May 25, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/congressional-oversight-4177013; Tom Murse, One-
Term US Presidents, List of Incumbent U.S. Presidents Denied Re-Election, THOUGHTCO (July 3, 
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party at the polls, but this opportunity only occurs every two or four years, 
leaving plenty of time for executive abuse.239  Constitutional checks, 
however, should prevent this malfeasance.  But when the Court interprets 
executive discretion to such an extent that it untethers him from the 
Constitution itself, then normal political checks, even judicial review, may 
no longer be effective against a rogue President.  Trump v. Hawaii’s 
submission to President Trump’s unconstitutional conduct can destroy the 
Republic, and give ultimate power to the very sort of demagogue which the 
Founders feared.  This is no time for slow deliberation. In these 
circumstances, Congress may have to consider a nuclear option. 
As of this writing, it is doing so against President Trump—albeit for 
different reasons.  In addition to their potential Articles of Impeachment, the 
United States House of Representatives should pass the following article: 
 
Impeaching, President of the United States for high crimes and 
misdemeanors, in violation of his constitutional oath to faithfully 
execute the Office of President of the United States and, to the best of 
his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed,  enforced policies upon religious 
minorities that violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
and statutes enacted to stop them.240 
 
The article will not pass the Senate.241  The Senate has never removed 
a President from office.242  But impeachment would make a statement that is 
not a dog whistle, but a blowhorn. 
 
2019), https://www.thought co.com/one-term-us-presidents-3322257 (“There have been nearly a 
dozen one-term presidents who ran for second terms but were denied by voters, but only three one-
term presidents since World War II.  The most recent one-term president who lost his re-election 
bid was George H.W. Bush, a Republican who lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992.”).  
 239.  Niall McCarthy, Historically, The President’s Party Performs Poorly In The Midterms, 
FORBES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/10/09/historically-the-
presidents-party-performs-poorly-in-the-midterms-infographic/#4620e3ca6732 (“Since 1946, the 
average midterm loss for the president’s party is 25 seats.”). 
 240.  See Approved Articles Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 1998), https://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm 
 241.  While the Democratic Party controls the U.S. House of Representative, President 
Trump’s party—the Republican Party—controls the Senate.  Thus, his removal from office is 
nearly impossible.  Senate Election Results 2018, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/ 
results. 
 242.  Tara Law, What to Know About the U.S. Presidents Who’ve Been Impeached, TIME (May 
13, 2019), https://time.com/5552679/impeached-presidents/ (“Impeaching an American President 
is rare.  It’s only happened twice in American history—to Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill 
Clinton—and neither of those times resulted in a president being removed from office.”). 
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